growth of the System be adequately understood". Yet while he finally acknowledged that a meeting had in fact taken place, Warburg offered very little detail. "Though eighteen years have since gone by", he wrote, "I do not feel free to give a description of this most interesting conference concerning which Senator Aldrich pledged all participants to secrecy."

Warburg only broke this pledge because he had learned that Nathaniel Wright Stephenson was about to publish a biography of Senator Aldrich, which included "an authorized account of this episode."

Although Stephenson's biography offered a basic description of the meeting, the passage of time limited the information that could be gathered from the key participants. By the time the news of the meeting became public, Aldrich had been dead for fifteen years. Henry Davison died in 1922, and it was left to Davison's protégé, Morgan partner Thomas W. Lamont, to write the story of his involvement. Lamont was able to call other details from Warburg before Warburg died in January 1932, but he actually told Lamont that he was not even sure who originated the meeting, though his own personal belief was that it was Davison. Two years later, Vanderlip stated in some of the details by publishing a series of autobiographical articles in the Saturday Evening Post, Vanderlip's account of the courts, and "11 miles of beach". Because none of the attendees was a member of the club at that time, another party or parties would have had to make a request on their behalf to use the club in the off-season. Though the party travelled to Georgia in Aldrich's private railway car, Aldrich did not become a member of the Club until 1912.

At the time of the meeting, J. Pierpont Morgan, the senior partner of J. P. Morgan, was one of the directors of the Club. He was also one of the original 1866 members, as was William Rockefeller, the president of Standard Oil who sat on the board of National City and whose wife, John D. Rockefeller Jr., was Aldrich's son-in-law (Rockefeller was an owner of a private cottage on the island). James Stillman, the chairman of the board of National City and whose two daughters married two of William Rockefeller's sons, had also been a member of the club since 1892. Whether Morgan, Stillman or Rockefeller was actually involved with the meeting, we do not know, but the idea that those present were acting as lieutenants for the senior members of their firms or for powerful family interests has become part of the popular lore feeding the perception that the Federal Reserve was created for and by Wall Street's elite.

The fact that the papers of the 2010 conference were published is one way in which the meetings at Jekyll Island clearly differ. The decision to hold the meeting there and the desire to share the proceedings are themselves signs of the extent to which the Federal Reserve has become the status quo. Even though the historical conditions of the Federal Reserve's work have changed, however, the proceedings indicate that the questions remain, such as those of public trust, the Fed's independence, and the theories and intentions of its leaders. The papers review the major debates on the Fed and monetary policy. Charles Calomiris's paper ("Volatile Ties and Persistent Conceptual Errors: U. S. monetary policy in 1914–1915") sums up the overarching historical questions: "What did the monetary authority do, why did it behave the way it did, what effects did its policies have, and what should it have done differently?" In other words, what can we learn, how can we learn, and have we learned from the history of the Federal Reserve? Because the Fed's history has been the subject of extensive analysis, it is important to consider how this volume is a contribution to the literature. The papers range from the intensively archival (Marc Flandreau and Stefano Ugolini, "Where It All Began: Lending of last resort at the Bank of England during the Overend-Gurney Panic of 1866") to econometric models (Lawrence J. Christiano and David Stock, "Government Policy, Credit Markets, and Economic Activity"). Questions include: did the action (or inaction) of the Fed create conditions that led to financial crisis? (Eugene N. White, "To Establish a More Effective Supervision of Banking: How the birth of the Federal Reserve bank supervisory function"); and why did the Fed fail to act as lender of last resort during the Great Depression? (Michael D. Bordo and David C. Wheelock, "The Promise and Performance of the Federal Reserve as Lender of Last Resort, 1914–1933")? Many of the papers focus on the Fed's failures and ask why the mistakes were made. The answers range from a lack of understanding or misconceptions of economic principles as they are now understood, to the cultural biases of American society, and political interference. One of the book's unique features is that it is structured in ways that link the authors of the articles and their commentators. It is in this interplay between papers and critique that the book is most engaging. Perhaps the volume could have gone even further to transmit and capture the questions and comments from the audience that must have been spontaneously volunteered on the day of
event. As often happens in academic conferences, the critiques also raise important questions and point out potential future research. In his response to Planaeau and Ugozino's article on the Bank of England, for example, Barry Eichengreen emphasizes the importance of studying the historical and political context in order to understand why central banks allow members of the banking community to fail. Allan Meltzer's response to Calomiris's article on recurring conceptual mistakes by the Fed highlights possible research into the unintended consequences of non-member banks being allowed to fail. In general, two larger themes emerge from the papers and their critiques. The first is the relationship between political and economic power, which as the participants point out has historically been expressed as the tension between the Fed and the state (whether Congress or the Treasury) or of the fear of politics intruding on the market and on monetary policy. The second is the importance of trust, a point made by several papers that preceded the discussion, the transcript serves as the final piece of the book.

Moderated by Raghuram Rajan, the panel discussion was introduced by Dennis Lockhart, began with video commentary by Paul Volcker, and featured Ben Bernanke, E. Gerald Corrigan and Alan Greenspan. Collectively, the group represented the leadership of the Federal Reserve and the respect for the macro-economic history of monetary policy is strong, it's been that way for a long time, and I think it will continue to be that way at the end of the day. The maintenance of that culture, including the feature of collegiality that I've spoken about, that those intangibles - to me more important than any technical analysis or intellectual brilliance - that in times of crisis makes it possible for the Federal Reserve to step in, to act, and to act forcibly in the national interest. Corrigan reiterated these points, emphasizing the importance of trust and "collegiality": "I talk a lot about the culture of the Federal Reserve. And I do think, that especially in these trying times, we should recognize, even for our critical friends in the academic community, that the culture of the Federal Reserve is strong, it's been that way for a long time, and I think it will continue to be that way at the end of the day. The maintenance of that culture, including the feature of collegiality that I've spoken about, that those intangibles - to me more important than any technical analysis or intellectual brilliance - that in times of crisis makes it possible for the Federal Reserve to step in, to act, and to act forcibly in the national interest."

Taken together, the chapters and panel discussion discuss suggest that the issue of trust persists over time and place and remains as relevant today as it did in Britain in the 1860s or in the United States in the 1910s. Even when discussing the most recent panic, Greenspan talked about how the lack of trust creates economic instability. While explaining the "two fundamental reforms" he felt were needed in the wake of 2008 ("One is to get adequate capital, and two, to get far higher levels of enforcement of fraud status"), Greenspan said, "Fraud creates very considerable instability in competitive markets. If you cannot trust your counterparties, it won't work, and indeed we saw that it didn't".

Trust and respect also play their part in the foundation story of the Fed. The participants' personal stories suggest that the popular view of Jekyll Island, of an establishment working together in their own interests, does not reflect reality. There was a history of cooperation between the different firms represented at the original meeting on Jekyll Island, but social and personal differences among the individual men who represented those firms would have been readily apparent. Paul Warburg, for example, was a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co, a German Jewish bank led by his brother-in-law and senior partner, Jacob H. Schiff, who was Peerpost Morgan's primary rival in private banking. The Kuhn, Loeb partners had socially distant relations with the partners of J. P. Morgan & Co and the firms were fundamental competitors, but they also had strong cooperative working relations because they were able to manage religious and ethnic conflict within their respective spheres of influence. Personally, Warburg had great respect for Davison, but they were not close friends. A gifted economist with a vast knowledge of European banking practices, Warburg left Kuhn, Loeb & Co to join the Federal Reserve board, but his tenure did not end well. During the First World War, he felt compelled to resign when his German origins and his familial ties to Germany gave critics an opportunity to cast suspicion on his loyalty and patriotism. Like Warburg, Frank Vanderlip also lacked the social capital of men such as Aldrich and Davison, the only two members of the party who became members of the Jekyll Island Club after the meeting in 1910. As Illinois native and the son of a farmer, Vanderlip had been a journalist and treasury official before joining National City. At the time of the meeting, he had only been president for about a year, and for most of his tenure, he worked under the close scrutiny of James Stillman. In February of the year he went to Jekyll Island, Vanderlip had a series of conflicts with J. P. Morgan & Co, believing that the Morgan partners were trying to undermine National City's position by building up the rival National Bank of Commerce. Though Vanderlip also had great respect for Davison, he fundamentally saw the banks as competitors and was territorial about National City's position. His dedication to the bank was not reciprocated, however, and by 1919, he left the bank because of conflicts with Stillman and William Rocke- feller after he was also denied the opportunity to become a majority shareholder. Relating personal micro-histories to the macro-economic history of monetary policy is not straightforward or simple. But if trust, respect and collegiality are as important to the history of the Federal Reserve as its contemporary leaders believe, then the historical basis for that trust and collegiality between the persons who collectively form the institution of the Federal Reserve seem worth investigating. At the very least, the stories raise other questions, as whether the relationships between banking institutions reflect those of their leaders. If, as the conference participants suggest, the relationships and culture of the Federal Reserve do affect the ways it interprets its responsibilities, understanding that process would, like the study of its past, also help us to understand how the Federal Reserve arrived at decisions that it has made and will make in the future.