Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at Rutgers University. He holds a B.A. from Universitat Pompeu Fabra and a Ph.D. in Economics from New York University. His research is concerned with game theory and public economic theory. His research on public economic theory has examined the consequences of electoral competition for the structure of tax systems and is currently concerned with the characterization of tax structures that reduce income inequality and polarization. His work on game theory is concerned with the study of solution concepts for general normal form and extensive form games. This research studies the properties of various equilibrium concepts in games with general type and action spaces, and provides simple conditions that can be used to determine equilibrium existence in applied work.
- "Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: The case of endogenous income," with Humberto Llavador, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
- "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games," with Richard McLean, Mathematics of Operations Research, forthcoming.
- "Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games," with Richard McLean, Theoretical Economics 9 (2014), 555-582.